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Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme
Court’s Sudden Expansion of
Conspiracy Liability (And Why
Bribe-Taking Foreign Officials Should
Take Note)
Michael F. Dearington*
Abstract
Last year, the United States Supreme Court decided a Hobbs
Act conspiracy case that could significantly expand the bounds of
the general federal conspiracy statute. In Ocasio v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016), the Court held that, under “age-old
principles of conspiracy law,” a police officer could conspire with
shop owners to extort those very same shop owners in violation of
the Hobbs Act. The corollary is that a shop owner can, in theory,
conspire to extort himself. If a shop owner can conspire to extort
himself as a matter of law, why can’t a bribe-taking foreign
official conspire to bribe himself in violation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)? This Article posits that, under
Ocasio’s flawed holding, and contrary to the oft-cited Fifth Circuit
decision, United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam), he probably can.
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I.

Introduction

Just last year, the United States Supreme Court decided a
Hobbs Act conspiracy case that could significantly expand the
bounds of the general federal conspiracy statute.1 Few have taken
notice. In Ocasio v. United States,2 the Court held that, under
“age-old principles of conspiracy law,” a police officer could
conspire with shop owners to extort those very same shop owners
in violation of the Hobbs Act.3 The corollary is that a shop owner
can, in theory, conspire to extort himself.4 If a shop owner can
conspire to extort himself as a matter of law, why can’t a
bribe-taking foreign official conspire to bribe himself? This Article
posits that, under Ocasio’s flawed holding, and contrary to the

1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
2. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016).
3. See id. at 1427 (rejecting the argument that a police officer “cannot be
convicted of conspiring with . . . shop-owners to obtain money from them under
the color of official right . . . . because it is contrary to age-old principles of
conspiracy law”).
4. See id.
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oft-cited Fifth Circuit decision United States v. Castle,5 he
probably can.
This Article first analyzes the Ocasio decision and argues
that the Supreme Court misapplied two early conspiracy-law
decisions, United States v. Holte6 and Gebardi v. United States,7
in reaching its anomalous holding in Ocasio.8 The Article then
turns its focus to a logical extension of Ocasio’s holding: Although
the Fifth Circuit’s longstanding Castle decision previously
precluded federal prosecutors from charging bribe-taking foreign
officials with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (“FCPA”)—leaving them to pursue other, more creative
charges—Ocasio’s holding casts doubt on Castle and could enable
prosecutors to charge bribe-taking foreign officials with FCPA
conspiracy.9
II.

Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court’s
Questionable Distillation of “Longstanding Principles
of Conspiracy Law”

In Ocasio, the Supreme Court held that “[u]nder
longstanding principles of conspiracy law, a defendant may be
convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof
that he entered into a conspiracy that had as its objective the
obtaining of property from another conspirator with his consent
and under color of official right.”10 In other words, a police officer
can conspire with a shop owner to extort the shop owner; and a
shop owner can theoretically conspire to extort himself.11 As
5. See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835–36 (5th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (declining to “extend the reach of the FCPA through the application of
the conspiracy statute” to bribe-taking foreign officials).
6. 236 U.S. 140 (1915).
7. 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
8. Infra Part II.
9. Infra Part III.
10. United States v. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016).
11. See id.; Kate Stith, No Entrenchment: Thomas on the Hobbs Act, the
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explained in this section, however, the Court based its curious
holding on two Mann Act cases that turned on the Mann Act’s
particular legislative history—and that cannot be neatly grafted
onto a Hobbs Act conspiracy case.
A. The Ocasio Decision
The facts of Ocasio are straightforward. Various Baltimore
police officers participated in a kickback scheme whereby they
would persuade vehicle owners who were involved in traffic
accidents to take their damaged vehicles to a particular
auto-repair shop, and in return the shop owners would pay the
officers kickbacks for each vehicle they consequently repaired.12
The petitioner, a former police officer who had been convicted of
conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, argued that as a matter of
law he could not have conspired with the shop owners to obtain
money from them under color of official right—essentially
because the shop owners could not conspire with the officer to
extort themselves.13
Despite the argument’s logical appeal, a divided Supreme
Court, with Justice Alito writing for the majority, upheld the
officer’s conspiracy conviction.14 The Court began by examining
black-letter law interpreting the general federal conspiracy
statute: “The government does not have to prove that [a]
defendant intended to commit the underlying offense
himself/herself,” the Court explained.15 “Instead, ‘[i]f conspirators
have a plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the
Ocasio Mess, and the Vagueness Doctrine, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 233, 236 (2017)
(“To be clear, as strange as it sounds, Ocasio held that a Hobbs Act ‘victim’ can
‘conspire’ in his own extortion.”).
12. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1427–28.
13. See id. at 1427 (describing the petitioner’s argument that “as a matter
of law, he cannot be convicted of conspiring with the shop owners to obtain
money from them under color of official right”).
14. See id. at 1436 (upholding the petitioner’s conspiracy conviction).
15. Id. at 1429.
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crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty
as the perpetrators.’”16 For instance,
[A] person may conspire to commit burglary without
agreeing to set foot inside the targeted home. It is
enough if the conspirator agrees to help the person who
will actually enter the dwelling, perhaps by serving as a
lookout or driving the getaway car. Likewise, “[a] specific
intent to distribute drugs oneself is not required to
secure a conviction for participating in a drug-trafficking
conspiracy.”17
Thus, under Ocasio, a shop owner need not commit a substantive
Hobbs Act offense as a predicate to a conspiracy charge, so long
as he conspired with another who would do so.18 This principle
did not resolve the ultimate question, though, because the shop
owner was not even capable of obtaining money from himself
under color of official right; so how could he conspire to do so? The
Court had an answer to that question, too.
The Court explained that a person may be convicted of
conspiracy even if the person is incapable of committing the
substantive offense himself.19 The Court waded into murkier
waters to illustrate this point, however, examining two early
Mann Act cases: United States v. Holte20 and Gebardi v. United
States.21 Section 2 of the Mann Act essentially provided that it
was illegal to knowingly cause to be transported a woman or girl
across state lines “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery,
or for any other immoral purpose.”22 In Holte and Gebardi, the
16. Id. at 1429–30 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64
(1997)).
17. Id. at 1430 (quoting United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir.
1994)).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1430 (commenting that a conspirator may be convicted even
though he is incapable of committing the substantive offense himself).
20. 236 U.S. 140 (1915).
21. 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
22. White-Slave Traffic Act of 1910 (the “Mann Act”), 61 Cong. Ch. 395, 36
Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (2012)).
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Supreme Court addressed whether and when a woman or girl
could be charged with conspiracy to transport herself across state
lines for an immoral purpose.23 In both decisions, the Court
reasoned that “an agreement to commit an offense may be
criminal, though its purpose is to do what some of the
conspirators may be free to do alone,”24 and he may also conspire
to commit a crime that he is incapable of committing himself.25
The Court in Holte and in Gebardi also noted that the Mann Act
did not implicate an exception to conspiracy liability that has
come to be known as Wharton’s Rule26—where “concurrence [is]
23. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 118–119; Holte, 236 U.S. at 144.
24. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 120; see also Holte, 236 U.S. at 144 (“[A]
conspiracy to accomplish what an individual is free to do may be a crime, and
even more plainly a person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a
third person.” (citations omitted)). The Court in Holte relied on Drew v. Thaw,
235 U.S. 432 (1914), where the Supreme Court denied habeas relief to a
defendant charged with conspiring with others to secure his escape from a
mental-health facility, even though the defendant, according to the defense,
could not be charged with the escape itself. Id. at 440. Whether a defendant can
be charged with conspiracy, the Drew Court explained, “depends on the statute.
It is perfectly possible and even may be rational to enact that a conspiracy to
accomplish what an individual is free to do shall be a crime.” Id. at 438.
25. Holte, 236 U.S. at 144; see Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 120–21 (“Incapacity of
one to commit the substantive offense does not necessarily imply that he may
with impunity conspire with others who are able to commit it.”). For instance, “a
conspiracy with an officer or employee of the government or any other for an
offense that only he could commit has been held for many years to fall within
the conspiracy section,” and “a woman may conspire to procure an abortion upon
herself when under the law she could not commit the substantive crime and
therefore, it has been held, could not be an accomplice,” even though “there may
be a degree of cooperation that would not amount to a crime, as where it was
held that a purchase of spirituous liquor from an unlicensed vendor was not a
crime in the purchaser although it was in the seller.” Holte, 236 U.S. at 144–45.
26. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 782–83 (1975) (“The
classic Wharton’s Rule offenses—adultery, incest, bigamy, dueling—are crimes
that are characterized by the general congruence of the agreement and the
completed substantive offense. . . . and the immediate consequences of the crime
rest on the parties themselves rather than on society at large.”). In Iannelli, the
Supreme Court noted that its “most complete description of the [Wharton’s
Rule] appears in” Gebardi. See id. at 774 n.8. But the Court noted that
“Wharton’s Rule owes its name to Francis Wharton, whose treatise on criminal
law identified the doctrine and its fundamental rationale.” Id. at 773. The Court
in Iannelli added that a third-party exception to the classic Wharton’s Rule
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necessary to effect [the] crime”27—because a woman could be
transported for an immoral purpose without her consent or
complicity.28 Holte and Gebardi require further explication to
understand their relevance to the facts in Ocasio.
In Holte, in a concise opinion penned by Justice Holmes, the
Court applied the foregoing principles in holding that a woman
can in some circumstances be charged with conspiring with a
man to transport herself across state lines for an immoral
purpose in violation of the Mann Act.29 The Court first reasoned
that a woman could in some circumstances commit a substantive
violation of the Mann Act—“for instance, [where] a professional
prostitute, as well able to look out for herself as was the man,
should suggest and carry out a journey within the act of 1910 in
the hope of blackmailing the man, and should buy the railroad
tickets, or should pay the fare from Jersey City to New York.”30
generally is thought to apply when a third party “ha[s] conspired with the
principals to encourage commission of the substantive offense.” Id. at 781 n.15.
“The rationale supporting this exception,” the Court reasoned, “appears to be
that the addition of a third party enhances the dangers presented by the
crime . . . [and] the legislature would not have intended to preclude punishment
for a combination of greater dimension than that required to commit the
substantive offense.” Id.
27. Holte, 236 U.S. at 145.
28. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–22 (describing how “criminal
transportation under the Mann Act may be effected without the woman’s
consent”).
29. Holte, 236 U.S. at 145. Justice Lamar, joined by Justice Day, argued in
dissent that the transported woman should be exempt from a conspiracy
prosecution in all cases based on the legislative intent behind the Mann Act,
which “treats the woman who is transported for use in the business of
prostitution as a victim—often a willing victim, but nevertheless a victim . . . .
[S]he cannot therefore be punished for being enslaved nor for consenting and
agreeing to be transported by [the man] for purposes of such business. To hold
otherwise, would make the law of conspiracy a sword with which to punish those
whom the [Mann Act] was intended to protect.” Id. at 147–48 (Lamar, J.,
dissenting). The dissent added that, “if . . . Congress had intended that they
should be subject to indictment for conspiracy, it would have so declared by
extending the penal consequences of the prohibited act to all persons aiding,
counseling, or encouraging the principal offender.” Id. at 150 (Lamar, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 145.

OCASIO V. UNITED STATES

211

The Court therefore saw no reason why a woman could not also
be charged with conspiracy to violate the Act based on the
preliminary agreement.31 To simplify, if the woman can in some
circumstances be charged with a substantive Mann Act violation,
why can’t she also be charged with conspiracy to violate the Act?
The Court thus upheld the indictment, but did not opine about
what facts would be required to support a conviction.32
In Gebardi, the Court held, with Justice Stone writing for the
majority, that although a woman can conspire to violate the
Mann Act in some circumstances, as the Court held in Holte,
evidence that a woman merely consented to being transported for
the immoral purpose—and therefore did not commit a
substantive violation—was insufficient to support a conspiracy
conviction.33
Critically, the Gebardi Court based its decision on
congressional intent, which the Court divined from the text and
legislative history of the Mann Act. The Court observed that
“Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases which
frequently, if not normally, involve consent and agreement on the
part of the woman to the forbidden transportation,”34 and yet
“this acquiescence, though an incident of a type of transportation
specifically dealt with by the statute, was not made a crime under
the Mann Act itself.”35 The Court thus perceived in the “failure of
the Mann Act to condemn the woman’s participation in those
transportations which are effected with her mere consent,
evidence of an affirmative legislative policy to leave her
acquiescence unpunished.”36 The Court noted that it was
“concerned with something more than an agreement between two
persons for one of them to commit an offense which the other

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. (upholding the indictment).
See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
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cannot commit”37—the situation in Ocasio. Indeed, the Court was
concerned with “the added element that the offense planned, the
criminal object of the conspiracy, involve[d] the agreement of the
woman to her transportation by the man, which is the very
conspiracy charged,”38 and which Congress contemplated would
“frequently, if not normally” be the case, but chose not to
criminalize.39 The Court rejected the view that “the very passage
of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute
of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers” upon a
woman who merely consents to her illicit travel.40 The Court’s
holdings in Holte and Gebardi, therefore, turned on congressional
intent in enacting the Mann Act evidenced by the text and
legislative history of the statute.41
The Court in Ocasio sought to distill the teachings in these
decisions, declaring:
Holte and Gebardi make perfectly clear that a person
may be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive
offense that he or she cannot personally commit. They
also show that when that person’s consent or
acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive
offense, something more than bare consent or
acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person
was a conspirator.42
The Court did not say, however, what that “something more”
could be. In the Mann Act context, facts sufficient to support the
conviction would have presumably involved the woman or girl
playing an active role in bringing about her illegal
transportation—rather than merely consenting to being
transported—which could also support a substantive Mann Act
37. Id. at 121; see also United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 144 (1915).
38. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121 (1932).
39. Id.; see Holte, 236 U.S. at 144.
40. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.
41. See id. at 121 (discussing what Congress “set out” to do in enacting the
Mann Act); Holte, 236 U.S. at 144 (addressing the text of the Mann Act).
42. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1432 (2016).
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conviction. But the Court was silent as to what facts were
required to support a Hobbs Act conviction in these
circumstances. Trumpeting the principles in Holte and Gebardi
as “longstanding principles of conspiracy law,”43 “age-old
principles of conspiracy law,”44 and “basic principles of conspiracy
law,”45 the Court concluded that “[t]hese basic principles of
conspiracy law resolve this case.”46
Based on Holte and Gebardi, the Ocasio Court held that,
“[a]lthough [the shop owners] were incapable of committing the
underlying substantive offense as principals, they could, under
the reasoning of Holte and Gebardi, nevertheless conspire to
commit Hobbs Act extortion by agreeing to help petitioner and
other officers commit the substantive offense” of extorting
themselves.47 The Court explained that,
[i]n order to establish the existence of a conspiracy to
violate the Hobbs Act, the Government has no obligation
to demonstrate that each conspirator agreed personally
to commit—or was even capable of committing—the
substantive offense of Hobbs Act extortion. It is sufficient
to prove that the conspirators agreed that the underlying
crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy who
was capable of committing it. In other words, each
conspirator must have specifically intended that some
conspirator commit each element of the substantive
offense.48
Based on the foregoing analysis, and without analyzing the
Hobbs Act’s legislative intent or purpose—or whether Congress
contemplated that the shop owners would “frequently, if not

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1429.
Id. at 1427.
Id. at 1432.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
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normally”49 agree to be extorted in typical cases—the Court
upheld the police officer’s conspiracy conviction.50
As noted above, the curious corollary of the Court’s holding is
that a shop owner can conspire with a police officer to extort
himself.51 This result requires further scrutiny.
B. Did Ocasio Improperly Extend Holte and Gebardi?
The Court in Ocasio arguably misinterpreted Holte and
Gebardi by extracting from those cases “basic principles of
conspiracy law” that were in fact tethered to Congress’s intent in
enacting the Mann Act.52 As a result, the Court extended a
holding specific to Mann Act conspiracy cases to a case involving
conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act—a statute with different text,
history, and legislative intent—thereby reaching the curious
holding that a police officer can conspire with a shop owner to
extort the shop owner.53 A more-careful application of Gebardi
and its test, however, may have yielded a different result.
At the outset, the Court in Ocasio may have
mischaracterized the Holte and Gebardi decisions by suggesting
that those cases involved defendants who were incapable of
violating the Mann Act.54 In Holte and Gebardi, the Court made
clear that a woman or girl could in some circumstances be
charged with a substantive violation of the Mann Act for illegally
transporting herself; thus, the cases did not turn on the principle
that a “a conspiracy with an officer or employee of the
49. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932).
50. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1436 (upholding the petitioner’s conviction).
51. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (addressing this result of
the Court’s decision).
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s use of
intent- and text-based interpretation in Gebardi and Holte).
53. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1431–32 (discussing Gebardi’s application to
the facts of the case).
54. See id. at 1432 (“Holte and Gebardi make perfectly clear that a person
may be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive offense that he or she
cannot personally commit.”).
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government or any other for an offense that only he could
commit . . . fall[s] within the conspiracy section,” even though the
Court in both cases noted this principle.55 Indeed, the Court in
Holte explained that if the woman were the driving force in
carrying out the Mann Act scheme—for example where she was a
“professional prostitute, as well able to look out for herself as was
the man,” and she suggested and carried out the journey “in the
hope of black-mailing the man,” including by buying railroad
tickets for the illicit travel—the Court “s[aw] no reason why” the
woman could not violate the Mann Act as a principal.56
Nevertheless, the Court in Ocasio seemed to suggest that the
Holte and Gebardi Courts “applied” the principle that a person
incapable of committing the substantive offense can still be a
conspirator.57 To the contrary, a careful reading of Holte and
Gebardi reveals otherwise, even if the woman in Gebardi was
incapable of committing the substantive offense based on the
particular facts proven at trial.58
Even more critically, the Court in Ocasio arguably
misapplied the central principle of conspiracy law established by
Gebardi when it ignored the Hobbs Act’s legislative intent in
reaching its decision. In Gebardi, the Court looked to the text and
55. United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915); see also Gebardi v.
United States, 287 U.S. 112, 120 (1932) (“Incapacity of one to commit the
substantive offense does not necessarily imply that he may with impunity
conspire with others who are able to commit it.”).
56. Holte, 236 U.S. at 145.
57. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430 (“The Court applied these principles in
two cases involving the Mann Act.”). The Court explained:
Holte and Gebardi make perfectly clear that a person may be convicted of
conspiring to commit a substantive offense that he or she cannot personally
commit. They also show that when that person’s consent or acquiescence is
inherent in the underlying substantive offense, something more than bare
consent or acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person was a
conspirator.
Id. at 1432 (emphasis added).
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical from
Holte where a woman could be found to have committed a substantive Mann Act
offense).
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legislative history of the Mann Act to decide whether Congress
intended that a woman who merely consented to the illicit
transport—and thus did not violate the substantive provisions of
the Mann Act—could be convicted of conspiracy to violate the
Mann Act.59 As noted above, the Court explained:
Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases
which frequently, if not normally, involve consent and
agreement on the part of the woman to the forbidden
transportation. In every case in which she is not
intimidated or forced into the transportation, the statute
necessarily contemplates her acquiescence. Yet this
acquiescence, though an incident of a type of
transportation specifically dealt with by the statute, was
not made a crime under the Mann Act itself . . . . We
[rest our decision] rather upon the ground that we
perceive in the failure of the Mann Act to condemn the
woman’s participation in those transportations which are
effected with her mere consent, evidence of an
affirmative legislative policy to leave her acquiescence
unpunished. We think it a necessary implication of that
policy that when the Mann Act and the conspiracy
statute came to be construed together, as they
necessarily would be, the same participation which the
former contemplates as an inseparable incident of all
cases in which the woman is a voluntary agent at all, but
does not punish, was not automatically to be made
punishable under the latter. It would contravene that
policy to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act
effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that
immunity which the Mann Act itself confers.60
In other words, the Gebardi principle holds that, when
Congress enacts a criminal statute that “frequently, if not
normally, involve[s] consent and agreement on the part of” a
particular party, but does not punish that conduct, Congress does
not intend to punish that same conduct under the general federal

59. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–23 (discussing Congress’s intent in
enacting the Mann Act).
60. Id.
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conspiracy statute.61 In Gebardi, that meant that because
Congress, in enacting the Mann Act, contemplated that the
woman would frequently consent to the illicit travel, but did not
elect to punish that conduct without more, Congress also did not
intend to punish that conduct under the conspiracy statute.62 Yet
if the woman in Gebardi had done more than merely consented to
the travel and had, for instance, “aid[ed] or assist[ed]” in causing
her illicit transportation, the woman would have violated the
substantive provision of the Mann Act and could also have
conspired to violate the Mann Act.63 Thus, the Gebardi Court
required more than “mere consent” to convict the woman of
conspiracy, presumably requiring conduct that would constitute a
substantive Mann Act offense and that Congress therefore
intended to punish under the Act.64
The Gebardi principle, then, is perhaps best understood to
mean that when the conduct of a particular class of actors (i.e.,
the transported woman) is “frequently, if not normally,” part of
the conduct that a substantive criminal statute aims to punish,
but the substantive statute leaves that class of actors’ conduct
unpunished, then that same conduct should not give rise to
conspiracy liability, because that was not Congress’s intent.65 In
this way, the Gebardi principle, like Wharton’s Rule,66 is a rule of
61. See id.
62. See id. (“It would contravene that policy to hold that the very passage
of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that
immunity which the Mann Act itself confers.”).
63. See id. at 118–19 (noting that the Mann Act does not punish the
woman for transporting herself).
64. See id. at 123 (concluding that Congress did not intend to punish mere
acquiescence to the transportation).
65. See id. at 121–23 (discussing how the substantive offense under the
Mann Act differs from conspiracy acts).
66. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785–86 (1975). The Court
in Iannelli explained:)
Wharton’s Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted
criminal activity, a plurality of criminal agents. In such cases, a
closer relationship exists between the conspiracy and the substantive
offense because both require collective criminal activity. The
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statutory construction intended to aid in determining legislative
intent when defining the contours of conspiracy liability.67 The
Ocasio Court’s interpretation of the general federal conspiracy
statute, detached from the text and legislative intent of the
predicate substantive offense, by contrast, can lead to a holding
that frustrates congressional intent.68 To be sure, the general
federal conspiracy statute aims to punish a separate offense than
the charged predicate offense; but Gebardi suggests that in some
cases courts should nevertheless consider whether Congress’s
intent to leave unpunished certain conduct under a substantive
criminal statute means that Congress also meant to leave that
conduct unpunished under the conspiracy statute.
The Ocasio Court thus misapplied the Gebardi principle
when it extended the Mann Act–specific holding from Gebardi to
the Hobbs Act, instead of focusing on whether Congress aimed to
punish the extorted shop owners under the conspiracy statute
when it passed the Hobbs Act.69 As Justice Sotomayor observed in
her dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, the majority in
Ocasio “stretches this Mann Act case beyond its tethers,” and
substantive offense therefore presents some of the same threats that
the law of conspiracy normally is thought to guard against, and it
cannot automatically be assumed that the Legislature intended the
conspiracy and the substantive offense to remain as discrete crimes
upon consummation of the latter. Thus, absent legislative intent to
the contrary, the Rule supports a presumption that the two merge
when the substantive offense is proved . . . . [A]s the Rule is
essentially an aid to the determination of legislative intent, it must
defer to a discernible legislative judgment.
67. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123 (finding an affirmative legislative intent
in the Mann Act to leave the woman’s mere acquiescence to the illicit transport
unpunished).
68. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (noting that the
Supreme Court resolved Ocasio on general principles of conspiracy law).
69. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1431 n.4 (describing the Gebardi reasoning
and conclusion). The Court in Ocasio downplayed the significance of the Mann
Act’s text in the Gebardi decision, reducing Gebardi’s discussion of the Mann
Act’s “affirmative legislative policy” to a footnote, and characterizing it as
merely part of the “path of reasoning by which the Gebardi Court reached [its]
conclusions.” Id.
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most of the “so-called” “age-old principles of conspiracy law”
relied upon by the majority “are derived from decisions that turn
on interpreting the text of another federal statute—the Mann
Act.”70
For the Ocasio Court to have properly applied the principle
in Gebardi, then—and putting aside the distinction that the shop
owner, unlike the woman in Gebardi, could not commit the
substantive Hobbs Act offense in Ocasio—the Court would have
needed to determine: (1) whether Congress, in enacting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a) and (b)(2) of the Hobbs Act, set out to deal with cases
that “frequently, if not normally, involve[d] consent and
agreement on the part of” an extorted party71 (here, a party from
whom someone has obtained property “with his consent . . . under
color of official right.”72); and, if so, (2) whether those sections of
the Hobbs Act punish the extorted party’s conduct.73 If Congress
enacted the Hobbs Act provision to deal with situations that
frequently, if not normally, involve parties who are extorted with
consent under color of official right, but did not punish the
extorted party’s conduct, then the Court should have perceived in
Congress’s “failure to condemn” the shop owner for his conduct
“an affirmative legislative policy to leave [the shop owner]
unpunished” for both the extortion and his agreement to being
extorted.74 But if Congress elected to punish that conduct as a
substantive offense, then the Court should sustain a conspiracy
charge predicated on that conduct.75
If the Court had undertaken this analysis, it may have
concluded that the Hobbs Act provisions at issue—which
70. Id. at 1443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also dissented,
but on the distinct ground that the Court should have overruled an earlier
decision relied upon by the majority, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255
(1992), which equated Hobbs Act extortion with bribery. Id. at 1437 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Stith, supra note 11, at 237–39.
71. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012).
73. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.
74. Id.
75. See id.
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proscribe extortion involving “the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent . . . under color of official right”—
contemplated that frequently the extorted persons will not only
have consented but also agreed to the scheme.76 If the Court
reached this conclusion, Gebardi would require the Court to hold
that the shop owner could not conspire to extort himself because
the Hobbs Act meant to leave unpunished his agreement to being
extorted.77 This principle would not leave unpunished, however,
an agreement by a third party incapable of committing the
substantive Hobbs Act violation but whose consent is not
frequently or normally involved, such as someone who identified
the shop owner as an extortion target for the police officers or
otherwise facilitated the scheme.
Having highlighted the arguable weaknesses in the Supreme
Court’s Ocasio decision, and its arguable misapplication of Holte
and Gebardi, this Article now turns to the question of how
Ocasio’s holding and interpretation of Holte and Gebardi could
expand the reach of the general federal conspiracy statute to
include bribe-taking foreign officials within its scope, despite the
Fifth Circuit’s oft-cited holding to the contrary in United States v.
Castle.78
III.

Corrupt Foreign Officials, Beware: Ocasio’s Potential
Impact on United States v. Castle and the Scope of
FCPA Conspiracy Liability

Setting aside the Ocasio decision’s arguable infirmities, this
Article considers the Ocasio decision’s potential impact on a

76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion to mean “the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear or under color of official right”).
77. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123 (holding that the woman’s consent did not
support her Mann Act conspiracy conviction).
78. 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
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specific area of conspiracy law long thought to have been settled:
foreign-official conspiracy liability under the FCPA.79
A. United States v. Castle
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit decided the seminal case of United
States v. Castle,80 holding that the Government cannot charge
bribe-taking foreign officials—who cannot as principals violate
the substantive provisions of the FCPA, which targets
bribe-payers—with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions.81 The Court in Castle concluded that, in enacting the
FCPA, “Congress affirmatively chose to exempt this small class of
persons from prosecution,” extending the Supreme Court’s
holding in Gebardi v. United States.82
In Castle, federal prosecutors in Texas charged Canadian
“foreign officials” Donald Castle and Darrell W.T. Lowry with
conspiracy to violate the FCPA.83 According to the indictment,
John Blondek and Vernon Tull, two U.S. citizens and employees
of Eagle Bus Company, a U.S. concern, paid Castle and Lowry a
bribe of $50,000 to secure a contract to provide buses to the
Saskatchewan provincial government.84 The Canadian officials
moved to dismiss the indictment, which the district court
granted, relying on Gebardi.85
79. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq.
(2012).
80. 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
81. See id. at 836 (noting an affirmative legislative policy to leave this
group unpunished).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 832 (noting that Castle and Lowry moved to dismiss the
indictment on the grounds that, as foreign officials, they could not be convicted
of the offense).
84. See id. (describing the allegations in the indictment).
85. See United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), aff’d
sub nom. Castle, 925 F.2d at 832 (holding that bribe-taking foreign officials
could not be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA in accordance with
Gebardi).
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, adopting the opinion of
the district court nearly in its entirety. At the outset, the Fifth
Circuit observed that:
There is no question that the payment of the bribe by
Defendants Blondek and Tull is illegal under the FCPA
and that they may be prosecuted for conspiring to violate
the Act. Nor is it disputed that Defendants Castle and
Lowry could not be charged with violating the FCPA
itself, since the Act does not criminalize the receipt of a
bribe by a foreign official.86
The Court continued: “[t]he issue here is whether the
Government may prosecute [Canadian foreign officials] Castle
and Lowry under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371,
for conspiring to violate the FCPA.”87 It cannot, the Fifth Circuit
held.88
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit extended
Gebardi’s rationale to foreign officials charged with conspiracy to
violate the FCPA. The Court explained:
The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Gebardi squarely applies to the case before this Court.
Congress intended in both the FCPA and the Mann Act
to deter and punish certain activities which necessarily
involved the agreement of at least two people, but
Congress chose in both statutes to punish only one party
to the agreement. In Gebardi the Supreme Court refused
to disregard Congress’ intention to exempt one party by
allowing the Executive to prosecute that party under the
general conspiracy statute for precisely the same
conduct. Congress made the same choice in drafting the
FCPA, and by the same analysis, this Court may not
allow the Executive to override the Congressional intent
not to prosecute foreign officials for their participation in
the prohibited acts.89

86.
87.
88.
89.

Castle, 925 F.2d at 832.
Id.
See id. at 836.
Id. at 833.
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The Court highlighted what it viewed as “overwhelming evidence
of a Congressional intent to exempt foreign officials from
prosecution for receiving bribes, especially since Congress knew it
had the power to reach foreign officials in many cases, and yet
declined to exercise that power.”90 The Court added, “[a]s in
Gebardi, it would be absurd to take away with the earlier and
more general conspiracy statute the exemption from prosecution
granted to foreign officials by the later and more specific FCPA.”91
Thus, the Court properly focused on legislative intent behind the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castle is not beyond reproach.
For example, the Court’s characterization of the Mann Act and
the FCPA as prohibiting “activities which necessarily involved
the agreement of at least two people”92 was doubly incorrect. In
Gebardi, the Supreme Court made clear that “criminal
transportation under the Mann Act may be effected without the
woman’s consent as in cases of intimidation or force,” such that
the principle known as Wharton’s Rule did not apply.93 Similarly,
a principal can violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions without
the agreement of a foreign official, for instance when a principal
offers a foreign official a bribe but the official declines to accept
it.94
90. Id.
91. Id. at 836.
92. Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
93. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 122 (1932) (emphasis added);
see supra notes 26 & 66 and accompanying text (discussing Wharton’s Rule and
the Gebardi Court’s explanation of the same).
94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (prohibiting issuers, domestic concerns, and
other persons from using bribery to influence foreign officials, foreign political
parties, and foreign candidates in order to obtain or retain business). The Fifth
Circuit may have meant that a violation of both the Mann Act and the FCPA
required the involvement of two parties—not the agreement or concurrence of
two parties. See, e.g., Castle, 925 F.2d at 833 n.1 (“In the Mann Act the two
necessary parties were the transporter and the transported woman, and in the
FCPA the necessary parties were the U.S. company paying the bribe and the
foreign official accepting it.”). The mere involvement of two parties in a violation
of the statute, moreover, would not trigger Wharton’s Rule absent the required
element that they entered into the agreement. See supra notes 26 & 66 and
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Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit’s application of Gebardi in
Castle was probably correct. Congress enacted the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA knowing that the proscribed conduct
frequently if not normally involved acceptance of bribes by
corrupt foreign officials, but did not condemn the foreign official’s
conduct under the statute. Thus, Congress probably did not
intend to create conspiracy liability for those foreign officials
when enacting the FCPA. That said, the Fifth Circuit may have
overstated the strength of this argument when it noted that
“evidence of a Congressional intent to exempt foreign officials
from prosecution for receiving bribes” was “overwhelming.”95
Indeed, the Government highlighted in its appellate brief in
Castle that the House Report relating to the FCPA’s passage
stated that “[t]he concepts of aiding and abetting and joint
participation would apply to a violation under this bill in the
same manner in which those concepts have always applied in
both SEC civil actions and implied private actions brought under
the securities laws generally.”96 Small wonder, then, that the
Government thought the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castle was
“patently incorrect.”97 On the other hand, the House Report may
not have had in mind bribe-taking foreign officials, as opposed to
bribe-payers who conspire with each other to pay bribes to those
officials.98
Castle’s holding has had a widespread impact. Indeed, Castle
is the only appellate decision to have decided the question of
accompanying text (discussing Wharton’s Rule).
95. See Castle, 925 F.2d at 833 (arguing that there was intent to exempt
foreign officials from the FCPA “since Congress knew it had the power to reach
foreign officials in many cases, and yet declined to exercise that power”).
96. See Brief for the United States at *21, United States v. Castle, 925
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1455), 1990 WL 10085129 (citing H.R. REP. NO.
95-640, at 8 (1977) (analyzing Section 2 of the Unlawful Corporate Payments
Act of 1977)) (emphasis added).
97. See id. at *13 (arguing that the lower court misread and misapplied
Gebardi).
98. For a comprehensive and fascinating look at the enactment of the
FCPA, see Michael Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73
OHIO ST. L. J. 929 (2012).
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whether a bribe-taking foreign official can conspire to violate the
FCPA, and the Government has fully accepted its holding. In the
decades since Castle, the Government has not prosecuted any
alleged bribe-taking foreign officials for conspiracy to violate the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. And the Department of Justice
itself has explained, in its FCPA Guidance released in 2012, that
bribe-taking foreign officials are not liable under the general
federal conspiracy statute for conspiracy to violate the FCPA.99
But the Ocasio100 decision calls all that into question.
B. Is Castle still good law?
The Ocasio decision seems to undermine the Castle decision
and suggest that the Government can charge bribe-taking foreign
officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions, so long as the bribe-taking foreign officials do more
than merely consent to the bribery scheme.
Ocasio makes clear that, “[n]ot only is it unnecessary for each
member of a conspiracy to agree to commit each element of the
substantive offense, but also a conspirator may be convicted even
though he was incapable of committing the substantive offense
himself.”101 The Court in Ocasio further held that, based on Holte
and Gebardi, “when that person’s consent or acquiescence is
inherent in the underlying substantive offense, something more
than bare consent or acquiescence may be needed to prove that
the person was a conspirator.”102 Based on these principles, the
Court in Ocasio concluded that “[a]lthough [the shop owners]
99. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE
GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 48–49 (2012) (citing Castle
and stating that, “although foreign officials cannot be prosecuted for FCPA
violations,” certain foreign officials have been prosecuted for money laundering).
100. See Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016) (upholding
conviction of a police officer for extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion
under the Hobbs Act).
101. Id. at 1430 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. at 1432.
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were incapable of committing the underlying substantive offense
as principals, they could, under the reasoning of Holte and
Gebardi, conspire to commit Hobbs Act extortion by agreeing to
help petitioner and other officers commit the substantive
offense.”103
Applying the foregoing reasoning in the FCPA context, a
foreign official arguably can be charged with conspiring to violate
the FCPA—at least where the bribe-taking foreign official has
done more than merely consented or acquiesced to accepting the
illicit bribe.
First, although a bribe-taking foreign official cannot violate
the FCPA as a principal—because the FCPA generally proscribes
the payment or offering of payment of bribes to foreign officials in
order to obtain or retain business—that prohibition does not
mean that a bribe-taking foreign official cannot conspire with a
principal to violate the FCPA.104 The Holte-Gebardi-Ocasio trio of
cases make clear that incapacity to commit the object of the
conspiracy, as a principal, does not bar a conspiracy count, which
charges a distinct offense.105
Second—although discussed only in Holte and Gebardi, and
not in Ocasio—Wharton’s Rule likely does not preclude charges
against a bribe-taking foreign official for conspiracy to violate the
FCPA. Just like under the Mann Act, where the Supreme Court
in Holte and Gebardi pointed out that the Act could be violated by
a principal without the consent or acquiescence of a woman,
warranting no Wharton’s Rule exception, a principal can violate
the FCPA without the consent or acquiescence of a foreign
official. For instance, a principal can violate the FCPA by using
the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly to
offer to pay a bribe to a foreign official in order to retain or obtain
103. Id. (footnote omitted).
104. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (prohibiting issuers, domestic concerns, and
other persons from using bribery to influence foreign officials, foreign political
parties, and foreign candidates in order to obtain or retain business).
105. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430; Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112,
120–21 (1932); United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915).
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business, where the official declines to accept the bribe.106 Or a
foreign official could hypothetically ask a principal to offer him a
bribe in violation of the FCPA, only to later decline to accept the
bribe due to a change of heart, or because he has selected a more
lucrative or otherwise-attractive offer from another bribe-payer
instead. Accordingly, Wharton’s Rule’s narrow application “to
offenses that require concerted criminal activity, a plurality of
criminal agents,”107 should not apply in the FCPA context.108
Finally, the Supreme Court’s key conclusion in Ocasio that
when the “consent or acquiescence” of a person incapable of
acting as a principal “is inherent in the underlying substantive
106. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
107. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975) (limiting
Wharton’s Rule’s application to only those offenses).
108. Moreover, a conspiracy to violate the FCPA entered into by a principal
and a bribe-taking foreign official raises concerns not found in the narrow
subset of cases to which Wharton’s Rule has traditionally applied. The Supreme
Court explained in Iannelli that “[t]he classic Wharton’s Rule offenses—
adultery, incest, bigamy, dueling—are crimes that are characterized by the
general congruence of the agreement and the substantive offense, and the
immediate consequences of the crime rest on the parties themselves rather than
on society at large.” Id. at 782–83 (emphasis added). Also, the conspiratorial
agreement in Wharton’s Rule cases tends to be unlikely “to pose the distinct
kinds of threats to society that the law of conspiracy seeks to avert,” for instance
where “an agreement to commit an offense . . . will produce agreements to
engage in a more general pattern of criminal conduct.” Id. at 783; see also
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (explaining that conspiracy
is “an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to
the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crimes,” involving
“deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the
conspiracies for further and habitual criminal practices,” and “characterized by
secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery,
and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered” (quoting United
States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915))). A conspiracy to violate the FCPA
between a bribe-paying principal and a foreign official, in contrast, results in
harm to those beyond “the parties themselves,” Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 782–83, due
to the misappropriation of public funds or corruption of the foreign official’s
decision. Cf. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1215 (8th Cir. 2010)
(noting that Wharton’s Rule’s does not apply to a conviction for conspiracy to
commit bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201 and under § 666 in part because “bribery
is not limited to the bribe-payor and recipient, as the crime involves public
corruption, which harms society at as a whole”).
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offense, something more than bare consent or acquiescence may
be needed to prove that the person was a conspirator,” seems to
support the view that a bribe-taking foreign official can in some
circumstances be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA.109
The Ocasio Court did not, as one of the dissents pointed out,
indicate when mere consent tips over into a conspiracy.110 But
several circumstances would likely suffice in the FCPA context.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which a senior official at
a foreign state-owned entity (“SOE”) in charge of contracting
informs a business executive that the official will be drafting a
request for proposal (“RFP”) for a lucrative contract. The foreign
official demands a bribe from the business executive, and
promises that in exchange for the bribe, the foreign official will
draft the RFP in a way that will guarantee that the SOE awards
the contract to the business executive’s company. The foreign
official threatens, however, that if the business executive does not
pay the bribe, his company will not win the contract and will also
be frozen out of all future RFPs issued by the SOE. The business
executive is at first reluctant to pay the bribe due to ethical and
legal concerns and his fear of being detected by the company’s
compliance department or, worse yet, by law-enforcement
officials. But after further prodding and pressure by the foreign
official, the business executive worries that he will jeopardize his
company’s ability to work with the SOE in the future if he does
not pay the bribe and may even lose his job. As a result, the
business executive pays the foreign official the demanded bribe,
and his company wins the contract. Consistent with Ocasio, has
the foreign official conspired to violate the FCPA?
In the foregoing example, the bribe-taking foreign official has
not merely consented to or acquiesced to the illegal bribe.
Rather, the foreign official is a “but for” cause of the principal’s
ultimate decision to violate the FCPA. If federal prosecutors were
to charge the foreign official in this scenario, they would have a
109. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432.
110. See id. at 1445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the ambiguity in the
Ocasio majority opinion about when “mere ‘consent’ tip[s] over into conspiracy”).
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colorable argument that the charges are consistent with the
“basic principles of conspiracy law” summarized in Ocasio and
articulated in Holte and Gebardi.111
The possibility that the Government could charge
bribe-taking foreign officials with conspiracy to violate the FCPA
is not merely academic. Since 2009, the Department of Justice’s
charging decisions in cases involving foreign bribery have evinced
a steadfast commitment to prosecuting bribe-taking foreign
officials, who compose the “demand side” of the foreign-bribery
equation and are thought by some to be a root cause of foreign
bribery.112 At the time this Article went to press, beginning with
the indictment of “foreign officials” Juthamas and Jittisopa
Siriwan on substantive and conspiracy money-laundering
charges, federal prosecutors have charged at least eleven “foreign
officials” with violations relating to various bribery schemes,
despite the Government’s view that these officials cannot be
charged with FCPA conspiracy in light of Castle.113 In particular,
111. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Ocasio suggests certain factors that
could be relevant in determining when consent has tipped over into conspiracy:
When does mere ‘consent’ tip over into conspiracy? Does it depend on
whose idea it was? Whether the bribe was floated as an ‘official
demand’ or a suggestion? How happy the citizen is to pay off the
public official? How much money is involved? Whether the citizen
gained a benefit (a liquor license) or avoided a loss (closing the
restaurant)? How many times the citizen paid the bribes? Whether he
ever resisted paying or called the police?
Id.
112. See, e.g., Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87
NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 781, 795–800 (2011) (describing the nature and frequency
of bribe demands by foreign officials). See generally Lucinda Low, The “Demand
Side” of Transnational Bribery & Corruption: Why Leveling the Playing Field on
the Supply Side Isn’t Enough, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (2015); Lindsay B.
Arrieta, Attacking Bribery at Its Core: Shifting Focus to the Demand Side of the
Bribery Equation, 45 PUB. CONT. L. J. 587 (2016).
113. See Indictment, United States v. Siriwan, 2009 WL 10667404 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2009) (Juthamas and Jittisopa Siriwan); Judgment and
Probation/Commitment Order for Defendant Gerald Green, United States v.
Green, No. 2:08-cr-00059-GW (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010), ECF No. 385 (Gerald
Green); Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order for Defendant Patricia
Toledo Green, United States v. Green, No. 2:08-cr-00059-GW (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
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2010), ECF No. 387 (Patricia Green); Film Executive and Spouse Found Guilty
of Paying Bribes to a Senior Thai Tourism Official to Obtain Lucrative
Contracts, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 14, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/filmexecutive-and-spouse-found-guilty-paying-bribes-senior-thai-tourism-officialobtain (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Two Florida Executives, One Florida Intermediary and Two Former
Haitian Government Officials Indicted for Their Alleged Participation in Foreign
Bribery
Scheme,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
(Dec.
7,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-florida-executives-one-florida-intermediaryand-two-former-haitian-government-officials (last visited Nov. 1, 2017)
(reporting on Robert Antoine and Jean Rene Duperval) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for
Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in
Haiti, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 25, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executivesentenced-15-years-prison-scheme-bribe-officials-state-ownedtelecommunications (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (mentioning Patrick Joseph in
allegations of a scheme to commit bribery) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); High-Ranking Bank Official at Venezuelan State Development
Bank Pleads Guilty to Participating in Bribery Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov.
18, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/high-ranking-bank-official-venezuelanstate-development-bank-pleads-guilty-participating (last visited Nov. 1, 2017)
(discussing Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez de Hernandez, former bank official of
Venezuela’s economic development bank) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Nuclear Energy Official Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering
Conspiracy Involving Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-nuclear-energyofficial-pleads-guilty-money-laundering-conspiracy-involving (last visited Nov.
1, 2017) (reporting on Vadim Mikerin) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Miami Businessman Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Fraud
Charges in Connection with Venezuela Bribery Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar.
23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/miami-businessman-pleads-guiltyforeign-bribery-and-fraud-charges-connection-venezuela (last visited Nov. 1,
2017) (discussing Jose Luis Ramos Castillo, Christian Javier Maldonado
Barillas, and Alfonzo Eliezer Gravina Munoz) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Former Guinean Minister of Mines Convicted of Receiving
and Laundering $8.5 Million in Bribes from China International Fund and
China Sonangol (May 4, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-guineanminister-mines-convicted-receiving-and-laundering-85-million-bribes-china (last
visited Nov. 1, 2017) (discussing Mahmoud Thiam, a former minister of the
Republic of Guinea) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also
Director of South Korea's Earthquake Research Center Convicted of Money
Laundering in Million Dollar Bribe Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 18, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/director-south-koreas-earthquake-researchcenter-convicted-money-laundering-million-dollar (last visited Nov. 1, 2017)
(“For the second time in recent months, the Criminal Division has convicted a
foreign official, [Heon-Cheol Chi], who solicited bribes and then laundered the
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federal prosecutors have successfully used the money-laundering
statute and the Travel Act, often in conjunction with the general
federal conspiracy statute, to prosecute bribe-taking foreign
officials in cases that involve FCPA charges against the
bribe-payers. These prosecutions, spanning 2009 to present,
appear to be part of the Government’s broader strategy of
targeting the “demand side” of foreign bribery.114
illicit proceeds in the United States. We will continue to hold such individuals
responsible and accountable.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). For further reading on this subject, see Michael Dearington, The
Challenges of Pursuing Foreign Bribe-Takers, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-challenges-of-pursuing-foreign-bribe-takers/
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law review);
Michael Dearington, From Siriwan to Gonzalez: Why the DOJ Altered The Way
it Charges Alleged Corrupt Foreign Officials, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/from-siriwan-to-gonzalez-why-the-doj-altered-the-wayit-charges-alleged-corrupt-foreign-officials/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law review).
114. The indictments brought in the Haiti Teleco case roughly coincided
with the Department of Justice’s launch of the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery
Initiative, in July 2010, which Attorney General Holder indicated was “aimed at
combating large-scale foreign official corruption and recovering public funds for
their intended—and proper—use: for the people of our nations.” Attorney
General Holder at the African Union Summit, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 25, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-african-unionsummit (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Attorney General Holder indicated that the Department of Justice is
“assembling a team of prosecutors who will focus exclusively on this work and
build upon efforts already underway to deter corruption, hold offenders
accountable, and protect public resources.” Id. Assistant Attorney General for
the Criminal Division Leslie Caldwell echoed this sentiment, remarking in
November 2014, “now we also are prosecuting the bribe takers, using our money
laundering and other laws . . . . Our efforts to hold bribe takers as well as bribe
payors accountable for their criminal conduct are greatly aided by out foreign
partners.” Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Speaks at American
Conference Institute’s 31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices
Act,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
(Nov.
19,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwellspeaks-american-conference-institute-s-31st (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Congress has joined in the effort to
deter and punish bribe-taking foreign officials, suggesting broad-based support
for an expansive enforcement approach. For instance, Congress recently enacted
the “Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act,” § 3 of which permits
the President to impose sanctions on any foreign person who, inter alia, “is a
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If the Government decides to challenge Castle, it will likely
wait for a test case involving facts similar to the example above—
where a zealous and aggressive foreign official was a “but for”
cause of the bribery scheme, and did not merely consent to the
scheme by accepting the bribes.115 In the meantime, however, the
Government will likely continue to prosecute bribe-taking foreign
officials, where appropriate, under the Money Laundering
Control Act or the Travel Act. And courts will continue to grapple

government official, or a senior associate of such an official, that is responsible
for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of
significant corruption, including the expropriation of private or public assets for
personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of
natural resources, bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of
corruption to foreign jurisdictions . . . .” Pub. L. No. 114–328, § 1263(a)(3), 130
Stat. 1999, 2534 (2016). For a detailed personal narrative of the events that led
to passage of the Act, see BILL BROWDER, RED NOTICE: A TRUE STORY OF HIGH
FINANCE, MURDER, AND ONE MAN’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (Simon & Schuster 2015).
115. A case involving the question of whether a nonresident foreign
national can be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA was pending before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit when this Article went to press.
In United States v. Hoskins, just months before the Supreme Court handed
down the Ocasio decision, a federal district court in the District of Connecticut
held that defendant Lawrence Hoskins—a nonresident foreign national charged
with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, substantive violations of the FCPA and
aiding and abetting the same, and money laundering and aiding and abetting
the same, all in connection with the Alstom bribery case—could not be held
criminally liable for conspiring to violate or aiding and abetting an FCPA
violation. No. 3:12-cr-238 (JBA), 2016 WL 1069645, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Mar. 16,
2016) (providing the District Court’s discussion and analysis of the legal issue).
The District Court observed, based on the text, structure, and legislative history
of the FCPA, that Congress had intended to exclude nonresident foreign
nationals from liability under Sections 78dd-3 and 78dd-2 of the FCPA unless
they acted while in the United States or acted as an agent of a domestic concern,
respectively. See id. at *2 (explaining the District Court’s prevailing
interpretation of the statute). Extending the Gebardi principle, the District
Court therefore concluded that a nonresident foreign national can only be
charged with conspiring to violate or aiding and abetting a violation of Section
78dd-2, at issue in the case, if he was conspiring or aiding and abetting as an
agent of a domestic concern. See id. at *6 (rejecting the Government’s
alternative interpretation of the FCPA). Although not squarely on point, this
case could present an opportunity for the Second Circuit to examine Ocasio’s
impact in the context of a different but related FCPA conspiracy case.
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with how to interpret the scope of the general federal conspiracy
statute, whose bounds remain unclear.

